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European Central Bank working paper series 58This paper assesses the prospects for monetary integration between Emerg-
ing East Asian (EEA) economies. Our empirical analysis is based on a simple
analytical framework for currency unions of small open economies, with a fo-
cus on the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of di⁄erent types of
shocks. Our empirical analysis looks at a number of supply-side characteris-
tics of EEA countries, distinguishing between aggregate and tradable sector
structural features. Moreover, we discuss the evidence on the cross-country
variation of disturbances hitting the region. Our study indicates that, at
present, EEA economies exhibit a high degree of cross-country supply diver-
sity, while there is no compelling evidence that shocks are highly correlated
across the region.
Keywords: East Asia; emerging economies; currency union; stabilisation
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AbstractNon-technical summary
Emerging East Asian (EEA) economies have exhibited the world￿ s fastest
growth rates of real output and exports over the last ￿fteen years. During
this period, their intra-regional trade has also expanded very rapidly, while
regional ￿nancial cooperation has been enhanced following the Asian crisis of
1997-1998. One useful test of how far Asian trade integration and regionalism
have proceeded consists of assessing whether these economies would bene￿t
from taking a further step into monetary integration. Such an evaluation
naturally involves careful consideration of structural aspects of the region,
including the degree of trade interdependence within and even outside the
region.
Against this background, the present paper assesses the prospects for mon-
etary integration between EEA economies. Our empirical analysis is based on
a simple analytical framework for currency unions of small open economies,
with a focus on the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of di⁄erent
types of shocks. This model extends the previous literature by allowing for
a richer setup with a broad set of shocks, the role of in￿ ation targets and
the choice of interest rates as the instrument of union-wide monetary policy.
Our empirical analysis looks at a number of supply-side characteristics of EEA
countries, distinguishing between aggregate and more speci￿cally tradable sec-
tor structural features. Moreover, we discuss the evidence on the cross-country
variation of disturbances hitting the region, as well as recent data on in￿ ation
targets. Our study indicates that, at present, EEA countries￿supply charac-
teristics remain rather diverse and that there is not very compelling evidence
that shocks are highly correlated across the region. The present paper does
not assess other important aspects that have attracted interest in the litera-
ture on monetary integration in Asia, such as the current state of institutional
development concerning economic and in particular ￿nancial regional integra-
tion, the incomplete ￿nancial market integration between EEA countries and
5
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December 2005the degree of strength of regional institutions aimed at pushing the integration
e⁄orts forward.
The previous analysis may help explain why the major issue for monetary
integration in EEA at present is not a formation of a currency union, but
rather monetary coordination under a variety of forms. However, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that integration via trade, ￿nancial and ￿nancial ￿ ows
go hand in hand with each other. For this reason, increasing trade, ￿nancial
and investment interdependence could reinforce each other over time, leading
to more mature conditions for deeper economic integration and in particu-
lar a monetary union. Understanding the implications of increasing spillovers
would also necessitate the use of approaches that deviate from our small open
economy assumption, incorporating the ￿ avour of either two-country or core-
periphery models, depending on the speci￿c con￿guration taking place. In
addition, further progress in real and monetary integration may prove instru-
mental in shaping ongoing developments in the sphere of domestic policies
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There is a wide-ranging and increasing literature on the experience and
prospects of monetary integration around the globe. One of the areas in the
world that has attracted considerable attention in recent years is East Asia,
with many studies having investigated whether the region could be suitable for
embarking in further monetary cooperation and eventually forming a currency
union. Among the reasons for this interest, we can mention the following
three. First, East Asian economies exhibit high shares of intra-regional trade.
Second, there is evidence of increasing ￿nancial market interdependence over
recent years.1 Third, there has been a number of initiatives regarding ￿nancial
cooperation following the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. Such cooperation most
notably includes the Chiang Mai initiative of May 2000, a network of bilateral
swap arrangements established among ASEAN+3 countries for the case of
speculative attacks against their currencies. Enhanced interaction via trade
and ￿nancial ￿ ows has proved instrumental in leading to monetary unions in
previous historical experiences.2
Most of the literature on the monetary integration of small open economies
is of an empirical nature, and while it is often rooted on some general the-
oretical underpinnings concerning so-called optimal currency area criteria it
is rarely explicit about the exact structure of the member economies and the
way monetary stabilisation concretely works. Partly explaining the latter, the
conduct of a monetary stabilisation policy in a currency union between small
open economies has received very little research attention. This is surprising,
given that monetary policy considerations are key to comparing a currency
1For instance, Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2005) ￿nd that deviations from international
parity conditions have recently shrunk for money markets within the Greater China region.
Such deviations can be attributed to the presence of capital controls and exchange rate
variability. The authors, however, note that the Chinese banking sector remains rather
insulated from regional developments.
2With regard to the role of ￿nancial integration, Kawai and Takagi (2005) review the
European Payments Union, the CFA Franc Zone and the Monetary Arab Fund to draw
lessons for East Asian countries.
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such comparisons is not called into question by the recent debate about the
optimality of exchange rate regimes. One strand of this literature has inter-
preted the instability of ￿xed exchange rate systems to imply that the only
viable long-term options for a country are a ￿ oating exchange rate or participa-
tion in a currency union. This view, commonly known as the "hollowing-out
hypothesis" was originally proposed by Fischer (2001). Alternatively, some
authors have stressed that many o¢ cially pure ￿ oating regimes are in prac-
tice managed ￿ oats, thereby defying the notion that intermediate regimes are
extinct. To the extent that the implied desire for relative exchange rate sta-
bility may be driven by regional competition considerations, this raises the
question whether such stability could be best achieved by regional monetary
cooperation and in particular the extreme case of a currency union. The latter
arrangement could, if economically justi￿ed and properly designed, help main-
tain exchange rate stability while mitigating credibility problems sometimes
arising in intermediate regimes.3
In terms of stabilisation policy, the existing literature identi￿es as a key
characteristic of a currency union that the authorities aim at union-wide ob-
jectives, while not accommodating for the speci￿c needs of each and every
country within the union. The most important cost implied by full monetary
integration consists of renouncing to an independent monetary policy for in-
￿ ation and output stability. For this reason, many studies have discussed from
di⁄erent perspectives how currency union￿ s stabilisation properties and indi-
vidual countries￿macroeconomic performance are a⁄ected by heterogeneity in
key structural parameters and the nature of disturbances. With regard to the
latter, analysts have focused on the consequences of union members exhibiting
positively correlated or common, as opposed to asymmetric, shocks. In the
case of countries in the emerging East Asia (EEA) region, the discussion of
3The idea of joining a currency union as a commitment strategy has been developed in
Alesina and Barro (2002).
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shocks have arguably been the impulse behind the collapse of ￿xed exchange
rate systems in the region and beyond. In this regard, some authors have
analysed the role of swings in the yen-dollar rate in the outbreak of the Asian
crisis of 1997-1998 in countries that were in practice pegging to the dollar, or
attaching high weights to the dollar in the conduct of their exchange rate pol-
icy. Moreover, the assessment of the suitability of various regions for currency
unions have focused on the prevalence of asymmetric shocks as a key indicator
of whether a region quali￿es as an optimal currency area (see Eichengreen and
Bayoumi, 1999, for a discussion focusing on East Asian countries).
In addition to analyses of currency unions based on their implications
for stabilisation policy, there are other factors - which are rather exogenous
to monetary policy per se - that have played a major role in the discussion
about monetary union. For example, there is evidence that the formation of
a currency union induces favourable credibility and trade-enhancing e⁄ects.
The latter, in particular, has been emphasised in the in￿ uential empirical
analysis of Rose (2001, 2002). He ￿nds strong evidence of a positive impact of
currency unions on trade.4 The positive impact on potential output via trade
and ￿nancial integration, as well as the experience with currency unions, has
led some analysts to assess more positively the possibility of a country joining
a currency union even before full economic integration is achieved. It has
however to be mentioned that not all of the considerations about currency
unions that are unrelated to the conduct of monetary policy lead to a support
of a common currency.
4Other studies ￿nding similar results are Engel and Rose (2002) and Glick and Rose
(2002). Bagella, Becchetti and Hasan (2004) investigate the direct output impact of EMU,
reporting that more stable macroeconomic policies have had a signi￿cant impact on the level
and growth rates of per capita GDP in euro area countries. For a meta-analysis of the size
of the currency union e⁄ect on international trade, see Rose (2004).
Another potential channel for welfare improvement from having a common currency is
that of fostering ￿nancial deepening across the union. In a similar vein, Plummer and Click
(2005) advocate the establishment of a common ASEAN basket of currencies as a way to
facilitating cross-issuance of bonds.
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direction of developing theoretical results on currency unions between small
open economies. The focus on small open economies implies that we neglect
the possibility of spillovers across countries of the type analysed by Lane￿ s
(2000) two-country model, and Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (1998a and 1998b)
core-periphery approach. We also abstract from de￿ning the exact unit of
account to be used within the union.5 We then use our model to assess the
prospects of monetary union between the EEA economies.6 By concentrating
on this group of countries, we follow most of the studies assessing prospective
monetary integration in Asia. The assumption that these economies are small
can be reconciled with the existence of cross-country correlations as a result
of common factors hitting the region from the outside. This is consistent with
the lack of compelling evidence of intra-regional correlations between domestic
shocks, which is one of the conclusions of this paper.
Our extension of the theory of currency unions draws from work that has
recently been integrated into the standard time inconsistency literature. Pre-
vious studies in this area include those by Lane (2000), who studies a two-
country model, and Ca￿Zorzi, De Santis and Zampolli (2005), who analyse
a currency union between a large and a small country.7 The model used in
the present paper is closest to Ca￿Zorzi and De Santis￿(2004) multi-country
approach, which is motivated by the experience of the accession of new mem-
ber states to the European Union. We extend the theoretical literature on
5The literature about monetary integration in EEA has formulated di⁄erent possible
optimal anchors. The latter include individual currencies such as the yen (Kwan, 2001),
the US dollar (Mundell, 2002) or the renminbi (Hefeker and Nabor, 2005). Moreover, some
studies propose a common basket of major currencies (Williamson, 1999, 2002, and Mussa,
Masson, Swoboda, Jadresic, Mauro and Berg, 2000). Ito (2002) argues that the latter
proposal can potentially be in con￿ ict with in￿ ation objectives. Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro
(2002) ￿nd no compelling case for a yen block by looking at output correlations around the
globe.
6More precisely, this paper de￿nes emerging East Asia as comprising the economies of
China, Hong Kong, India, South Korea (henceforth Korea), Taiwan and ASEAN-5. The
latter grouping is composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
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policy in terms on decisions about the interest rate, which is, realistically, the
union-wide monetary policy instrument. Formerly, the focus has been on the
equilibrium outcome in terms of optimal in￿ ation (Ca￿Zorzi and De Santis,
2004, and Ca￿Zorzi, De Santis and Zampolli, 2005), or in addition on money
supply as the authorities￿policy instrument (Lane, 2000). Second, we fully
endogeneise macroeconomic developments in output, in￿ ation, interest rates
and exchange rates. In doing so, in particular, we deviate from Ca￿Zorzi
and De Santis￿(2004) and Ca￿Zorzi, De Santis and Zampolli￿ s (2005) focus
on Balassa-Samuelson-type exogenous productivity factors driving in￿ ation.
Third, we study a rather general set of shocks as given by supply, demand
and risk premium disturbances while also allowing in￿ ation targets to play
a role, in line with the recent literature on small open economies spawned
by Ball (1999, 2002) and Svensson (2000). As in Lane (2000), we permit
shocks to adopt three di⁄erent features, namely, to be common, idiosyncratic
or asymmetric. Fourth, the present paper explicitly models the role of im-
ported in￿ ation. As a result, members of a currency union are allowed to face
di⁄erent imported in￿ ation as stemming from a di⁄erent commodity com-
position of their international trade and di⁄erent e⁄ective exchange rates as
resulting from di⁄erent geographical composition of trade.8 Fifth, we allow
supply schedules to di⁄er across countries.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the model
is laid out. In section 3, monetary policy in a currency union is studied. In
section 4 we apply the lessons from the model to EEA economies by looking at
the latter￿ s speci￿c structural characteristics in order to assess the prospects
of monetary integration in the region. Section 5 concludes.
8A role for geographical composition of trade also features in Ogawa and Ito (2000). They
show that an EEA economy￿ s choice of the exchange rate (or weights in a basket comprising
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In order to investigate monetary stabilisation matters in a monetary union, let
us consider a simple small open economy model. Four equations describe the
behaviour of the private sector in each of the union￿ s members i = 1;2;:::;N :
yi = ￿i (￿i ￿ ￿e
i) + "i (1)
yi = ￿￿iri ￿ ￿iei + &i (2)
ri = ￿iei + "
f
i (3)
ri = R ￿ ￿e
i;+1 (4)
where all variables are expressed as deviations from steady state values and,
with the exception of the nominal and real interest rate, are in logarithms.
Constants have been normalised to zero. All parameters are assumed to be
positive. All shocks are of the zero-mean, constant variance, type, and serially
correlated. They are also assumed to be uncorrelated with each other for each
economy i, but allowed to be correlated across countries, as is made clear
below.
Equation (1) is a simple aggregate supply schedule which states that out-
put (yi) responds positively to surprises from the last period￿ s expectations of
the in￿ ation level (￿i ￿ ￿e
i) .9 Expression (2) states that aggregate demand
is decreasing in the (short-term) real interest rate (ri). Output also depends
negatively on the real exchange rate (ei). Note that an increase in ei denotes
an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Equation (3) posits a positive rela-
tion between interest rates and exchange rates that can be interpreted to mean
9For simplicity, we do not include an exchange rate pass-through term in equation (1).
The latter is customarily shown to a⁄ect monetary policy in a rather simple way by modifying
in￿ ation targets with an extra term that corrects for temporary deviations from long run
real exchange rate. See Ball (2002) and SÆnchez (2005).
For the case of EEA countries, the degree of pass-through is considered in any case to be
rather small (see Ca￿Zorzi, Hahn and SÆnchez, 2004).
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ation. Other determinants of exchange rates, such as investor con￿dence and
expectations, are captured by the error "
f
i .10 Finally, (4) is the Fisher equa-
tion de￿ning the real interest rate as a di⁄erence between nominal short-term
interest rate R (decided by the currency union￿ s monetary authority) and the
current period￿ s expectation of future in￿ ation, ￿e
i;+1. Positive values for "i
and &i represent favourable supply and demand shocks, respectively, while a
positive value for "
f
i is interpreted to re￿ ect an adverse risk premium shock.
Ca￿Zorzi and De Santis (2004) close their model by relating in￿ ation di⁄er-
entials between the union￿ s members to an aggregate measure of real exchange
rate developments, which they decompose into an expected part and a shock.
They also interpret such real exchange rate developments in terms of produc-
tivity di⁄erentials between tradable and non-tradable sectors. By closing the
model by deriving the monetary policy reaction function, the present model
endogenously determines macroeconomic developments. Moreover, it allows
us to undertake a deeper analysis of the shocks a⁄ecting the non-tradable
and imported components of in￿ ation as shown in the Appendix. In par-
ticular, we decompose supply shock "i into three exogenous factors a⁄ecting
supply. These are shocks to non-tradable in￿ ation and two tradable sector
disturbances, namely, one a⁄ecting tradable prices in foreign currency and ag-
gregated by using country-speci￿c weights (due to di⁄erent commodity com-
positions of international trade) and shocks to nominal e⁄ective exchange rates
which are also idiosyncratic due to speci￿c shares of di⁄erent trading partners.
The implications of this decomposition will be discussed in more detail when
10It has been argued that EEA countries￿exchange rates are dependent on each other. For
instance, policymakers in these economies may have in mind exchange rates vis-￿-vis each
other as a⁄ecting competitiveness in both intra-regional and extra-regional markets. More-
over, contagion could lead to spillovers across EEA currencies. The present model is able to
address these sources of exchange rate interaction as follows. Cross-country competitiveness
concerns can be handled by allowing for correlation between demand shocks between any
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applying the present theory to emerging East Asian countries.3 Monetary policy in a currency union
By de￿nition, there is but a single monetary policy for a currency union. We
assume that the monetary authority of the currency union cares equally about
each member country.11 The monetary authority recognises that it can only
a⁄ect aggregate union-wide output and in￿ ation, and not their distribution
between the di⁄erent member countries. Even if monetary policy (and hence
aggregate output and in￿ ation) does not respond to pure asymmetric shocks,
the geographical composition of output and in￿ ation will change.











In (5), the objective function of the central bank is assumed to penalise de-
partures of union-wide output and in￿ ation from desired values set to zero
and
~
￿u, respectively.13 The latter is assumed to adopt a ￿xed and credible
value, as a result of this also being the case for country-level in￿ ation targets.
The union￿ s central bank has no incentive to surprise the private sector with
in￿ ation, and there thus is no in￿ ation bias. Parameter ￿ is the weight of
in￿ ation aversion of the central bank relative to the aim of achieving output
stabilisation.
Taking averages over (1), we get
11This is a natural assumption and could be generated, for example, by a central bank
board with representatives from each participating country that bargained over monetary
policy decisions.
12Recent work in macroeconomics, most prominently by Woodford (2003), shows that
quadratic loss functions such as (5) here can be, under certain conditions, interpreted as a
second order approximation to the welfare of the representative agent. The present paper
makes the standard simplifying assumption that the marginal rate of substitution between
the target is independent of the economic structure. This assumption is however relaxed in
the context of optimising frameworks. For an analysis of the dichotomy between economic
structure and policy objectives, see Walsh (2005).
13Union-wide variables are weighted averages using weights ’i 2 (0;1).
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’i(￿i ￿ ￿u)(￿i ￿ ￿e
i) (6)
We assume that the union￿ s public knows ￿i, ￿i; ￿i, ￿i;
~
￿i; the distribution
of the disturbances "i, &i and "
f
i , for all i, and that it observes the nominal
interest and exchange rates. We also assume that there is full information,
in the sense that the central bank, producers and foreign exchange market
participants all observe current output, prices and nominal exchange rates.
With this information, and knowledge of the structure of the model, they are
in a position to deduce the sources of the shocks that hit the economy. A
state-contingent reaction function is then feasible.
The sequence of events is standard. The private sector forms expectations
on prices, conditionally on the information available at that time. The output
shock is realised and, ￿nally, monetary policy is set. Monetary authorities,
therefore, have an informational advantage with respect to private agents.
The game is solved by backward induction.
Replacing (6) into (5), di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿u to get the ￿rst-
order condition and imposing rational expectations, we derive an expression












where we have also used the result that ￿e
u =
~
￿u. It is reasonable to assume





￿i; which means that expected in￿ ation equals expected
targeted in￿ ation not only at the union level, but also for each country. As
a result, in (4), ri = R ￿
~
￿i: Using these results, alongside expressions (1),
































i ￿ 1=￿i; a ￿
￿
￿2
u+￿; bi ￿ 1 + ￿u
￿2
u+￿(￿i ￿ ￿u); ci ￿
di
￿i





: Expression (8) formulates the reaction of the nominal
interest rate, which is the central bank￿ s policy instrument, to aggregates of
shocks and in￿ ation targets at the country level. As expected, R is raised
in response to adverse supply and risk premium shocks, favourable demand
shocks and higher desired in￿ ation, judging from the aggregates that appear in
(8). If shocks are asymmetric in the sense that they equal zero at the aggregate
level, R could still be changed depending on country-speci￿c parameter values.
However, if the supply schedule parameter ￿i shows no cross-country variation,
then pure asymmetric shocks to "i and &i would have no impact on monetary
authorities￿decisions. If in addition, the bunch of model parameters grouped
as ci shows no cross-country variation, then the same conclusion can be reached
regarding pure asymmetric shocks to "
f
i .
We use (6), (7) and (8) to derive expressions of union-wide output and
































where f ￿ B
Aa; gi ￿ 1 ￿ B
A￿0















l ￿ 1 ￿ f; mi ￿ 1 ￿ B





















: Equations (9) and (10) indicate that union-wide out-
put and in￿ ation hover around their desired values. Inspection of coe¢ cients
entering both expressions leads to a natural interpretation uncovering that sta-
bilisation policy is at work, helping partially o⁄set shocks impacting output
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and in￿ ation.Inspection of (9) and (10) uncovers how deviations of yu and ￿u from
desired levels are determined. Unexpected developments in each and every
country i contribute to determine yu and ￿u, while also inducing monetary
policy responses. Macroeconomic developments are driven by country-level
shocks and in￿ ation targets, their impact also re￿ ecting the relative impor-
tance of the countries involved and the reactions in each of them as in￿ uenced
by country-level structural parameters. Country-level shocks and in￿ ation tar-
gets and the union￿ s interest rate reaction also contribute to determine output
and in￿ ation in any country. More concretely, in the case of supply shocks, the
second terms in (9) and (10) re￿ ect the following mechanism: if any country
i is subjected to such shock the reaction of union-wide output and in￿ ation
will be increasing on both the size of that country, ’i and the latter￿ s respon-
siveness of in￿ ation to output, ￿0
i: A tradeo⁄ is captured by coe¢ cients f and
l; which add up to one, which means that the overall e⁄ect of supply shocks
is exhausted by being distributed among output and in￿ ation. The direct im-
pacts of both the in￿ ation targets and shocks other than those a⁄ecting the
supply schedules are likewise in￿ uenced by structural parameters. They also
re￿ ect to some extent o⁄set by monetary policy (as can be seen in the minus
signs entering the corresponding coe¢ cients), their overall impact once more
depending on the distribution of parameter values and shocks across countries.
Use of (8), (9) and (10) lead to a new expression for the realised loss
























where s ￿ ￿u + C
Aa; ti ￿ (￿i ￿ ￿u) ￿ C
Abi; ui ￿ ￿i
￿i
￿








(￿i ￿ ￿u) ￿ C









The expected loss in the currency union, E(Lu), can be derived by taking
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￿j: We denote the unconditional variance
of any disturbance x by ￿2
x; and the unconditional covariance between any pair
(x;y) by ￿xy: Constant C in (11) hovers around zero depending on country-
speci￿c parameter values. In order to simplify the interpretation of the results
in both (11) and (12), we set C = 0 in (12).14 As we shall see in the next






for a given set of values for ’i and ￿0
i: For C = 0 (a case
we denote by using superscript x); the realised and expected loss functions in
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x
i ￿ ￿i









In (14), E(Lu) is a positive function of the variances of shocks in each
member country. These variances are weighted by the square of the share of
each participant to the union and also a⁄ected by the square of the supply
schedule parameter ￿0
i. In particular, a relatively high variance of shocks in
14Keeping parameter C at zero turns out to imply that we should also allow for some
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too large.
Turning to the role of country-speci￿c in￿ ation targets
~
￿i, (13) and (14)
indicate that a con￿guration in which larger countries have lower desired in-
￿ ation than that targeted by smaller countries in the union, this con￿guration
contributes positively to the stabilisation performance of a currency union.
The opposite holds if the distribution of
~
￿i across countries is reversed.
A deeper understanding of welfare implications requires the consideration
of di⁄erent types of shocks according to their distribution across the union. In-
deed, the cross-country cross-products of shocks in (13) and the cross-country
covariances of shocks in the term ￿x in (14) have di⁄erent welfare implications
depending in particular on their sign. In the case of each shock considered here
(be it either a supply, demand or risk premium shock), we examine the three
types of shocks, namely: (i) asymmetric shocks; (ii) idiosyncratic (￿national￿ )
shocks; and (iii) common shocks.15 Shocks are normalised to be of unit mag-
nitude for country I; which is the focus of our comparisons across regimes.
Asymmetric shocks are de￿ned to be shocks such that they add up to zero at
the currency union level; in particular, country I of size ’I is assumed to face
a shock equal to 1, while each of the remaining countries faces a shock equal
to ￿’I=(1 ￿ ’I): Idiosyncratic shocks are those in which shocks to country
I equal 1, and shocks to any other country equal 0. Finally, common shocks
are de￿ned to be shocks such that they add up to one at the currency union
level; in particular, all countries are assumed to face a shock equal to 1: In
terms of the unconditional cross-country covariances in (14), an asymmetric
shock implies a negative such covariance between country I and the remaining
countries in the union, an idiosyncratic shock amounts to a zero covariance
15Some authors argue that increased trade integration might lead to higher cross-country
correlation of shocks, that is, more likely common shocks (see Frankel and Rose, 1998). This
implies that if, as discussed before, the formation of a currency union induces deeper trade
integration, it could thus indirectly increase the likelihood of common shocks. In the case of
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shock means that the covariance between country I and each of the remaining
countries in the union is 1.
Against this background, the impact of idiosyncratic demand and risk
premium shocks on the union￿ s welfare is constrained to the hit country￿ s eco-
nomic magnitude within the total. Idiosyncratic shocks, by being concentrated
in one single country, are only in part o⁄set by union-wide interest rate re-
sponses. This means that the hit country￿ s in￿ ation and output developments
are to some extent shaped by the disturbances in question. It is worth saying
that, even in this case where no shocks are a⁄ecting other countries, monetary
policy has an e⁄ect on the latter￿ s macroeconomic developments. Depending
in particular on whether the hit country￿ s size is bigger or smaller, the e⁄ects
of monetary policy on in￿ ation and output everywhere else in the union could
prove to be larger or more subdued.
From a very general point of view, the cross-country distribution of sup-
ply, demand and risk premium shocks as well as the values of in￿ ation targets
a⁄ect the union￿ s welfare loss in either realised or expected terms - as in Lu
or E(Lu), respectively - in a way that depends on speci￿c parameter values.
The only result that is parameter-free regarding cross-products or covariances
of shocks is that the distribution of supply shocks across the union has a pos-
itive welfare contribution if shocks are negatively correlated and a negative
welfare contribution if shocks are positively correlated. In other words, the
sign of cross-country covariances of supply shocks is the same as that of their
in￿ uence on the monetary union￿ s stabilisation properties.16 The reason is
that asymmetric supply shocks tend to o⁄set each other, thereby facilitating
monetary policy response to this type of shocks which directly a⁄ect the trade-
16Looking at a problem that is di⁄erent from the one discussed here, the optimal currency
area literature ￿nds that the sign of cross-country covariances of supply shocks is the opposite
of that of their in￿ uence on member countries￿welfare. The intuition behind the latter result
is that if the incidence of shocks is similar across partner countries, then the need for policy
autonomy is reduced and the net bene￿ts from adopting a single currency might be higher.
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case, one benchmark situation is when the supply slope parameter is uniform
across the union. In this case, ￿i = ￿u for all i; and any con￿guration of
demand and risk premium shocks across countries do not have any impact on
welfare as measured by either Lu or E(Lu). Neither do country-speci￿c in￿ a-
tion targets
~
￿i: In case ￿i displays variation across countries, cross-products of
shocks in Lu and the corresponding covariances in E(Lu) are weighted by the
cross-products of both participant￿ s shares ’i and supply schedule parameters
￿0
i; and so are cross-products of in￿ ation targets as well. In addition, these
cross-terms involve ￿i=￿i in the case of risk premium shocks and (￿i + ￿i=￿i)
for in￿ ation targets. In particular, weighing by the cross-products of partic-
ipant￿ s shares ’i means that, regardless of how these shocks are distributed
across the union, smaller countries have less of an impact on overall welfare
considerations.
We now turn to the study of common and asymmetric demand and risk
premium shocks. When the participants to the currency area di⁄er in supply
structure, with discrepancies captured by the wedge ￿i ￿￿u, common shocks￿
impact on either realised or expected welfare loss in general depends on speci￿c
parameter values. However, in any case, given the common nature of the
shocks, there is a factor that would dampen welfare losses: for any country
I with parameter ￿I above union￿ s average ￿u undergoing a shock of size 1;
there must be at least some country J (with I 6= J) with parameter ￿J below
union￿ s average ￿u also experiencing a shock of size 1: In this sense, the impact
of demand and risk premium shocks on welfare tends to be dampened the more
common these shocks are. The o⁄setting e⁄ect involved is consistent with the
result that if these shocks are common, it is easier for the central bank to
respond to them by interest rate changes that reasonably accommodate for
each country￿ s needs.
17The need for no monetary policy action in the case of pure asymmetric shocks means
that individual countries adjust fully to them.
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monetary stabilisation at the union level. To see this, the argument behind the
dampening e⁄ect of common shocks works here in reverse. For any country
I with parameter ￿I above union￿ s average ￿u undergoing a shock of size 1;
there must be at least some country J (with I 6= J) with parameter ￿J below
union￿ s average ￿u experiencing a negative shock equal to ￿’I=(1 ￿ ’I): As
a result, the e⁄ect of demand and risk premium shocks on welfare tends to be
magni￿ed in the presence of asymmetric disturbances. The amplifying e⁄ect
involved is consistent with the result that if these shocks are asymmetric, the
central bank￿ s response to them by interest rate changes is more muted, leaving
to a large extent each country to face the consequences of the shocks.
To conclude, we have seen that the distribution of cross-products or cross-
covariances of supply shocks across the union matters, having a positive welfare
contribution if shocks are negatively correlated across countries and a negative
contribution if shocks are positively correlated. Taking as a benchmark the
case when the supply slope parameter is uniform across the union, demand and
risk premium shocks across countries fail to have an impact on welfare, and so
do country-speci￿c in￿ ation targets. Furthermore, we have stressed that the
gap between country-level supply parameter ￿i and its union-wide counter-
part, ￿u plays an important role in judging welfare e⁄ects of demand and risk
premium shocks, as well as in assessing the stabilisation policy implications of
country-speci￿c in￿ ation targets. When allowing for cross-country variation
in the supply slope parameter, the analysis shows that the participation of a
small open economy in a currency union may entail costs to the latter if de-
mand and risk premium disturbances are idiosyncratic or asymmetric. Such
costs will in general depend on speci￿c parameter values, and in particular on
the size of the country or countries hit, with smaller countries having smaller
welfare implications and bearing most of the e⁄ects in the absence of domes-
tic correcting factors. Common shocks instead exhibit a built-in dampening
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area.
4 Assessment of monetary integration prospects in
emerging East Asia
The analysis of realised and expected loss functions (11) and (14) highlights
the importance of several structural aspects for the assessment of the relative
performance of monetary stabilisation in a currency union. Interestingly, the
assessment has to be conducted taking the di⁄erent elements into account in
a holistic fashion. The reason for this is that the e⁄ect of a given country￿ s
structural characteristics depends on other such features, and in addition, on
the con￿guration of structural parameters across the union.
Against this background, the following three aspects of emerging East
Asian (EEA) economies are analysed in turn. First, we gauge the degree
of similarity or heterogeneity in supply conditions. The role of this factor as a
key element of "real" convergence is apparent. As we have stressed, the gap
between country-level supply parameter ￿i and its union-wide counterpart,
￿i ￿ ￿u, is important in judging welfare e⁄ects of demand and risk aversion
shocks, as well as being a possibly amplifying factor to in￿ ation target di⁄eren-
tials. Gaps ￿i￿￿u can be the result of non-tradable sector speci￿cities, or stem
from di⁄erential degrees of trade openness.18 In addition to slope parameter
￿i; other supply determinants such as expected in￿ ation ￿e
i and productivity
shock term "i are a⁄ected by structural factors once more concerning either
the non-tradable or tradable sector. In this regard, the Appendix empha-
sises the role of tradable in￿ ation. The latter can in part be explained by
country-speci￿c features relating to either idiosyncratic commodity compo-
18On a deeper level, cross-country supply-side di⁄erences are a⁄ected by technological
developments, market structure, households￿preferences regarding work, etc.
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trading partners. The latter factors have the potential to create di⁄erential
e⁄ective exchange rate e⁄ects within a currency union as a result of swings in
union￿ s extra-area bilateral exchange rates. Second, the size of a given country
is important. In this regard, we have assessed that while smaller countries con-
tribute by less to union-wide shocks, while they are the ones standing the most
to lose from idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks. The occurrence of these types
of shocks in larger countries also a⁄ect their welfare but, due to the latter￿ s
larger size and thus their contribution to overall macroeconomic objectives,
they are in a better position to bene￿t from stabilisation policy. Third, we
turn to correlations of shocks across countries. As we have seen, such correla-
tions can a⁄ect welfare at the currency-union level in di⁄erent ways depending
on parameter values as well as the nature of the shocks themselves.
4.1 Supply-side characteristics and size
We start by studying a number of characteristics of EEA countries that helps
us gauge supply-side diversity. As a background to our analysis, it is worth
bearing in mind that, over the last ￿fteen years, EEA￿ s outstanding economic
performance has been accompanied by considerable transformations in each
and every country￿ s production structure and trade and investment patterns.
In particular, enhanced intra-regional specialisation has facilitated greater
￿ ows of trade and investment across EEA countries. EEA economies have
expanded on a sustained basis over the last ￿fteen years, thereby increasing
their share in global GDP from some 11.2% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2004 (Table
1). Almost 85% of this increase can be attributed to the emergence of China
as a signi￿cant global economic player, its share in world output rising from
5.9% to 13.5% over the same period. Indeed, China has recorded the fastest
output and export growth rates of the EEA region and has attracted the bulk
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ity growth and capital accumulation brought about by the liberalisation and
opening up of its economy to global trade and capital ￿ ows. The aggregate
of ASEAN-5 countries increased its share in global GDP by around 1% over
the same period, now accounting for about 5% of the total. Moreover, EEA￿ s
economic expansion has been outward-oriented in nature. The share of the
region￿ s exports in the world total has risen from 12.4% to 20.4% between
1990 and 2004 (Table 2). Over 60% of this improvement stems from China￿ s
outstanding export growth, with the country becoming the third largest ex-
porter in the world in 2004 (the euro area and the United States being the
two largest). Most other countries in the region have also managed to exhibit
an increase above world average in their penetration of foreign markets.
The sizes of di⁄erent EEA countries look rather uneven, ranging from
larger China (currently the world￿ s sixth economy by size) to the smaller
economies of Malaysia, Philippines and Hong Kong. The remaining economies
stand in an intermediate position. In terms of our currency union analysis,
the monetary authorities would tend to react more strongly to shocks hitting
China, and in a second place some of the other larger economies (for instance,
Singapore, Korea or Taiwan). The smaller economies in the union would have
much less of an impact, being left to face a considerable share of the shocks
hitting them. Of course, this conclusion abstracts from using any information
about the correlation of shocks across EEA countries - an issue we discuss in
more detail below.
One other factor directly in￿ uencing supply parameter ￿i is the degree
of openness of an economy, as shown in the Appendix. One way to quickly
assess large cross-country discrepancies in openness is by comparing the shares
of each country in world GDP and exports. (The reason why we emphasise
"large" is that shares in world GDP are PPP-adjusted while those in world
exports are not, which can prevent too precise comparisons between them.) We
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in some countries, with the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore standing
out as the most open economies in the region.
We now turn to the analysis of some indicators that help us gauge the
degree of similarity of EEA supply structures. Lacking direct estimates of
supply slope parameters ￿i and factors underpinning supply shock "i, we ini-
tially have a look at structural factors relating to rather aggregate supply
characteristics of di⁄erent EEA countries. After doing this, we shall more
speci￿cally investigate supply-side features regarding the tradable sector.
The more aggregate analysis of EEA supply characteristics includes the
stage of development as measured by per capita income, the shares of di⁄er-
ent sectors in the economy, and scores in some competitiveness surveys looking
at the quality of institutions and preparedness for technological advance. The
rise of the region as a global player has been accompanied by a signi￿cant
transformation of its economies. Growing levels of per capita real incomes
have resulted to di⁄erent degrees from a rapid absorption of workers into the
industrial sector, an increasingly educated labour force, rapid capital accu-
mulation and technological upgrading to improve the e¢ ciency of resources.
Taking a longer-term perspective, per capita income has risen since 1990 with
no signs of deceleration from the pace exhibited prior to that (Table 3). In
terms of their present well-being, three distinct groups of countries are easily
identi￿ed: the richer city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore with income ex-
ceeding USD 20,000 per head, the maturing economies of Korea and Taiwan
with per capita incomes of some USD 12,000-13,000, and the grouping of the
remaining economies with incomes of USD 4,000 or less per person.
Higher aggregate productivity normally requires sectoral shifts in the work-
force during the growth process from low productivity agricultural or rural
sectors to relatively high productivity, non-agricultural or urban sectors. In
this regard, EEA￿ s development process appears to have evolved according
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declined and that of services has increased over time (Table 4). While the
share of services has tended to increase overall in the higher per capita in-
come countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan, it has recently
approached percentages of around two thirds or higher, which are comparable
with those of advanced economies. The manufacturing sector currently repre-
sents less than a quarter of the economies of Hong Kong, about one quarter
of those of Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Singapore, and a higher share in
Malaysia, Thailand and China.
Turning to the analysis of global competitiveness reports, we look at in-
dicators produced by World Economic Forum (WEF), the Institute for Man-
agement Developments (IMD), and INSEAD and WEF. The WEF￿ s Global
Competitiveness Report computes an overall index for 104 countries that is
composed of two sub-indices: ￿rst, the growth competitiveness index that as-
sesses an economy￿ s ability to attain economic growth over the medium and
long term, and second, the business competitiveness index that measures the
ability of ￿rms to create valuable goods and services using e¢ cient methods
(see Table 5). IMD￿ s world competitiveness scoreboard ranks 60 countries
following a methodology that is broadly similar to that used by WEF for its
business competitiveness sub-index. A more speci￿cally designed index is the
network readiness index reported for 104 countries by INSEAD and WEF in
their Global Information Technology Report. This index focuses on an assess-
ment of the role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the
development process (Table 5).
Table 5 shows that the di⁄erent indicators rank EEA countries broadly
similarly and that this carries over to even the more focused INSEAD/WEF￿ s
index of readiness for high-tech activities. In particular, the rankings tend to
re￿ ect the degree of economic development, as captured by the level of per
capita income as previously discussed (Table 3). For instance, economies at
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rea and Taiwan, also tend to exhibit higher scores in most indicators. China,
EEA￿ s largest economy, tends to occupy lower places, similar to other rela-
tively less developed countries in the region. The broad consistency between
competitiveness indicators and stage of development is simply a consequence
of the fact that competitiveness is to some extent determined by the growth
process itself. Indeed, richer countries who count with more resources for the
development of infrastructures that facilitate production and innovation. The
similarity of rankings may further re￿ ect the quality of institutions that un-
derpin competitiveness, which may arguably also be correlated with a given
country￿ s stage of development.
Our study of supply-side characteristics relating to the tradable sector
includes country-speci￿c commodity and geographical compositions of trade,
which contribute to determine imported in￿ ation in foreign currency (￿￿e
i +"￿
i)
and e⁄ective exchange rates (se
i+ i), as discussed in the Appendix (see expres-
sion (A.2)). As members of a currency union, countries still face idiosyncratic
determinants of their imported in￿ ation and e⁄ective exchange rates, even if
they face the same tradable in￿ ation for any given good in foreign currency
and have - as is the case of a currency union - both ￿xed bilateral rates among
each other and common bilateral rates against third countries. In line with
the study of the geographical compositions of trade, we compare the evolution
of nominal and real e⁄ective exchange rates (NEER and REER, respectively)
across EEA economies.
EEA countries exhibit some cross-country variation in their commodity
composition of international trade (Tables 6 and 7). The largest SITC sector
in terms of both imports and exports is given by machinery and transport
equipment, with the exception of the shares reported by Chinese trade statis-
tics and the one for Indonesian exports. In all other cases, in 2004 the shares
of this category of goods ranged from roughly 30% to 60% of total imports,
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be detected in the other sectors. Moreover, the role of raw materials in total
trade varies across EEA economies. China, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand exhibit large shares of imports of non-fuel crude
materials, while Korea and Indonesia in particular stand out in the case of
mineral fuel imports, their share in the total exceeding the 20% mark in 2004.
The only large shares in exports of raw materials correspond to Indonesia
(with mineral fuels and non-fuel materials explaining 26.2% and 8.4% of total
sales abroad in 2004, respectively) and Malaysia and Singapore, each export-
ing more than 10% of the total in terms of mineral fuels. Finally, the share of
trade in food has tended to be larger in the cases of some ASEAN-5 countries
(such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and in the case of exports, Thailand).
The region￿ s exceptional performance in GDP growth and export growth
is associated with e¢ ciency gains derived from increasing regionalisation of
the production process within the region.21 Enhanced regionalisation has
contributed to a considerable rise in the importance of intra-regional trade
among EEA economies over the last ￿fteen years (Table 8). Over this period,
the share of intra-regional trade has roughly increased by some 10-20% for
most economies, with the exception of China and Hong Kong whose bilateral
trade has been a⁄ected by a downward structural shift towards more direct
trade to and from China circumventing Hong Kong as a trading hub. As a
result, there has been a convergence in the share of intra-regional trade across
countries over the last ￿fteen years, while there still is some idiosyncratic vari-
20Lam, SÆnchez and Tan (2004) present a more detailed examination of the two sectors
registering the region￿ s fastest export growth since the 1990s (except for the "not elsewhere
speci￿ed" items), namely, machinery and transport equipment, and chemicals.
21The region￿ s diverse pool of countries in terms of their stage in the development process
allows for labour-intensive downstream stages of the production process to be shifted to lower
per capita income countries such as China, while more mature industrial economies such as
Korea and Taiwan specialise in exports of higher value-added machinery and components.
As a result, the competitiveness of regional products as a whole has been fostered through
economies of scale and a better organisation of the production process, using comparative
advantages of each and every country.
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trade currently rank highest in the region. Most other countries exhibit a cor-
responding share of 30 to 40%. Given that China explains a large fraction of
the recent gains in intra-regional trade, from the perspective of the creation of
a currency union it would matter whether this country is in the union or not -
its absence considerably reducing the degree of trade interaction in the region.
Finally, it is worth stressing that the present analysis of trade does not distin-
guish between trade induced by EEA economies￿domestic demand and other
sources of trade (including processing trade aiming at third countries or even
transactions of merchandise in transit - the latter playing an important role in
the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore). The degree of export re-processing
within the region has been rather high in recent years, thereby limiting the
impact of intra-regional trade on inducing higher similarity of EEA production
structures.22
With regard to extra-regional trade, the shares of Japan, US and euro
area in total trade of each EEA country￿ s trade are currently similar to those
observed in 1990 (Table 8). Among the largest changes in individual coun-
try￿ s shares with the world￿ s three largest advanced economic areas, Korean
trade with Japan lost ground to both trade with the US and intra-regional
transactions, while Indonesian trade with Japan was to some extent replaced
with intra-regional sales. In 2003, EEA economies￿trade with Japan, the US
and the euro area was rather evenly split among these three areas, with the
euro area representing a smaller share of the Philippines￿trade than each of
the other two advanced economies, and a larger share of Indian trade against
the same benchmark. The convergence in shares of extra-regional trade across
countries could prove helpful in not further amplifying the large shocks at
times hitting EEA countries as a result of sudden ￿ uctuations in the value of
22See, e.g., Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004), who estimate China￿ s export re-processing to
be about half of the country￿ s total trade.
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The evolution of NEER and REER indicates that EEA countries￿e⁄ective
exchange rates have displayed considerable cross-country variability over the
past ￿fteen years (Tables 9 and 10). This is the case even if we take out periods
over which exchange rate behaviour was shaped by country-speci￿c changes
(such as China￿ s decision to abandon its dual exchange rate regime in 1994)
or when some countries reacted with the whole spectrum of intensity to major
widespread shocks such as the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. It is worth stressing
that the concepts of NEER and REER capture somewhat di⁄erent factors.
From a cross-country point of view, NEER respond to di⁄erential in￿ ation-
ary pressures as well as di⁄erential geographical compositions of international
trade. REER adds to those discrepancies the ones about the structure of the
economy under consideration, which in￿ uence price determination and the
weights of di⁄erent goods in its own de￿ ator.
The evolution of REER is rather revealing about the trend of EEA compet-
itiveness over the past ￿fteen years (Table 10). In comparison with 1990, all
EEA countries￿REER have lost some value with the exception of Hong Kong,
which has appreciated in real terms, and Singapore, whose REER is roughly
unchanged (Table 10). The extent of the real depreciation varies across coun-
tries, ranging from 10% to 25%. The weakening of the currencies was already
evident in non-ASEAN-5 countries in the mid-1990s, a time in which China
uni￿ed its exchange rates. The magnitude of these real depreciations increased
during and after the period of the Asian ￿nancial crisis in 1997-98. However,
also countries that did not experience signi￿cant nominal depreciations during
the Asian ￿nancial crisis faced some sizeable real depreciations over the past
￿fteen years, foremost China with a 11.3% REER depreciation since 1990.
23McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) investigate the role of the yen/US dollar rate in East
Asian economies, providing evidence that a major yen devaluation has a negative impact
on their real economic activity. Kang, Kim and Wang (2005) qualify this conclusion by
showing that the e⁄ects of the weakening of the yen against the US dollar exchange rate on
the Korean economy are statistically signi￿cant only since the Asian crisis.
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is likely to have contributed to providing these countries with some further
impetus in their export penetration of the global market.
In sum, EEA economies appear to have rather diverse supply characteris-
tics. The aggregate study of EEA structural features indicates that the region
displays signi￿cant cross-country variation in the stage of development, the
shares of di⁄erent sectors in the economy, size, the degree of openness and
some key qualitative aspects such as the quality of institutions and prepared-
ness for technological advance. Our analysis of supply-side characteristics
relating to the tradable sector shows that EEA countries constitute a rather
diverse pool in terms of commodity compositions of trade, while there has
been some convergence in terms of their geographical compositions of trade.
The former is a negative factor contributing to create nominal divergence via
di⁄erential imported in￿ ation, while the latter fares better in this same area
by mitigating e⁄ective exchange rate variability in the presence of large swings
in the value of major currencies. Enhanced geographical convergence in trade
patterns has not however been enough to fully o⁄set cross-country variability
in EEA countries￿e⁄ective exchange rates. The latter variability has been
observed to some extent on a rather continuous basis, and not only in periods
over which exchange rate behaviour was shaped by country-speci￿c changes or
when some countries reacted to major disturbances facing the region. Finally,
it is worth saying that there are tradeo⁄s involved between these di⁄erent
supply-side characteristics. In particular, more intense and geographically
convergent trade interactions are to some extent the result of structural di-
versity regarding economic development and sectoral specialisations. While
the former factor is found in itself to have a positive contribution to monetary
stabilisation in a currency area, the latter is - taken in isolation - a negative
factor contributing to hamper union-wide stabilisation properties.
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This subsection continues to assess structural factors about EEA economies,
while going beyond the focus on supply by reviewing the evidence on the
correlation of a wide variety of shocks.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen￿ s (1994) seminal work assesses the nature of
disturbances using a sample of 9 East Asian countries over the period 1969￿
89, alongside 15 EU countries over 1963￿ 90. They break down unexpected
macro developments into demand and supply shocks ￿ la Blanchard and Quah
(1989), ￿nding that there is little di⁄erence in the asymmetry of both shocks
between Europe and East Asia. They detect high correlation of shocks partic-
ularly among some of the pairs involving Japan, Korea, Taiwan Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.24
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) complement Bayoumi and Eichengreen￿ s
(1994) analysis by employing an optimal currency area (OCA) index.25 Some
pairs of countries in East Asia are found to be somewhat plausible candidates
for a monetary union as the members of the EU. These pairs are: Singapore-
Malaysia, Singapore-Thailand, Singapore-Hong Kong, Singapore-Taiwan and
Hong Kong-Taiwan. Other pairs, those including Indonesia, South Korea and
the Philippines, do not rank high, while the Malaysia-Thailand pair displays
a very weak score.
Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) update Bayoumi and Eichengreen￿ s (1994)
study using data for 11 East Asian countries over 1968￿ 98 as well as the
same 15 EU member states over 1969￿ 89. Shocks are highly correlated among
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, that is, a smaller club of East
24The authors also report relatively fast speed of adjustment to shocks in East Asia.
Almost all of the change in output and prices in response to a shock takes place in the ￿rst
two years, compared with at most half in Europe. These results are consistent with the
notion that labour markets are relatively ￿ exible in East Asia.
25The OCA index is based on a regression where the LHS variable is the standard deviation
of the change in the logarithm of the end-year bilateral exchange rate between any two
countries. The RHS variables measure the sectoral diversity of trade, the degree of openness,
and size. The countries considered are Japan and its 19 leading trading partners (excluding
China, due to lack of data availability) over the period 1976-1995.
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the authors conclude that, while they are less suited for a regional currency
arrangement than Europe, the di⁄erence is not large.26
Baek and Song (2002) cover a larger group of 14 East-Asian economies over
the period 1970￿ 1999. They identify a group of six countries (Hong Kong, In-
donesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) experiencing symmetric sup-
ply disturbances. Singapore and Taiwan share similar demand disturbances
with this group, while China￿ s economic disturbances are small in size and
quickly absorbed. Thus, they claim that these nine countries are viable can-
didates for a currency union (EA9). Compared with the European Monetary
Union prior to 1990, the EA9 economies show larger disturbances but faster
adjustment speeds. With small disturbances and rapid adjustments, China is
close to the European anchor country, Germany.
More recently, Clavel, R￿⁄er, SÆnchez and Shen (2005) have deviated from
Blanchard and Quah￿ s approach to identi￿cation.27 Using sign-restricted VAR
models and controlling for external developments, they analyse the 10 largest
Emerging Asian countries over the period 1979-2003. They relate three types
of domestic shocks (supply, real demand and monetary) across Emerging Asia
in terms of correlation and principal component analysis. In some cases, some
degree of co-movement between pairs of individual countries￿shocks is found,
but by and large intra-regional factors do not appear to be particularly impor-
tant. The results indicate that economic developments in Emerging Asia are
largely driven by country-speci￿c shocks, with some indication that exogenous
shocks are becoming more important over time as the region is integrated into
the global economy. Regionalisation, in contrast, seems to be of only limited
importance. Taken altogether, these ￿ndings are consistent with the dynamic
26They also by and large con￿rm Bayoumi and Eichengreen￿ s (1994) result on the relatively
fast speed of adjustment in the countries under study.
27They make the observation that the use of Blanchard and Quah￿ s approach is subject
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ter ￿nd that in both Asia and Latin America, macroeconomic ￿ uctuations
are largely explained by domestic factors, while extra-regional and especially
intra-regional developments play a considerably more modest role.
Finally, Girardin (2005) examines the similarities of GDP growth-cycle
features of 10 East Asian countries over 1978￿ 2002. He computes contem-
poraneous correlations of smoothed probabilities of two regimes, namely, the
growth-recession and rapid growth regimes between China or Japan and other
East Asian economies. For the overall period, growth-recessions in China or
Japan are substantially correlated both with Indonesia and Thailand, while
Hong Kong, South Korea and Malaysia also correlate with China, and Singa-
pore and Taiwan with Japan. In Girardin￿ s subsample results for the 1990s,
all countries, except Taiwan, are correlated with the two North East Asian
economies, but in almost all cases correlations with China are much larger
than with Japan. The degree of correlation of most East Asian countries with
China is comparable to that found in Europe over 1970￿ 1996. Overall, on
the basis of the experience of the 1990s with growth-cycle synchronisation,
Girardin concludes that China would be a better candidate for monetary inte-
gration with East Asian countries than Japan, but not yet a perfect candidate.
The papers on the correlation of shocks in EEA reviewed above are not
strictly comparable. They constitute a heterogeneous whole in terms of ob-
jectives, methodologies and samples. Our review of this literature indicates
that the evidence produced is not very clear, with di⁄erent analyses point-
ing to di⁄erent groups of plausible partners for monetary cooperation (or no
such group at all) based on the similarity of various shocks and sometimes the
speed of adjustment. One tentative conclusion that, at present, we can draw
from this diverse pool of studies is that there is not very compelling evidence
that shocks are highly correlated across the region. The analysis of shock
correlations among EEA countries remains a fruitful area for further research.
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As we have seen, in￿ ation targets are treated in our model as a parameter,
and are thus not strictly comparable to a shock. They enter however welfare
considerations, with higher levels of in￿ ation targets having, ceteris paribus, a
more adverse e⁄ect on stabilisation properties the larger the country is.
In order to assess the role of in￿ ation targets in EEA countries, we focus
on those middle-income countries in the region that have recently adopted
in￿ ation targeting (IT) in the post-Asian-crisis period. The latter economies
have at the same time moved towards somewhat larger exchange rate ￿ exi-
bility. Such decisions were taken by South Korea in 1998, Indonesia in 2000,
Thailand in 2000, and the Philippines in 2001. In￿ ation rates have declined
to some extent relative to the crisis and pre-crisis periods in Korea, Thailand
and the Philippines (although factors such as the contractionary e⁄ects of the
crisis were also important in this process), while the situation for Indonesia is
not altogether clear. If we start the analysis from the time of implementation
of IT in these four countries, the in￿ ation performances of the new regimes
against their stated targets have thus far been commendable, with Thailand,
Korea and the Philippines have tended to be within target, although Korea
also surpassed its 2001 and 2002 targets and the Philippines undershot its
targets in 2002 and 2003, and overshot it in 2004 (Table 11). Indonesia has
in the meantime experienced di¢ culties keeping its in￿ ation within its target
range, its move to a more realistic target since 2003 perhaps signalling that
the country might sustain a better future performance in this area.
In sum, the larger countries among the group of in￿ ation targeters have
showed lower desired in￿ ation than that proposed by smaller countries in the
subgroup. This con￿guration contributes positively to stabilisation perfor-
mance of a currency union, as previously analysed. However, the smaller
economies of Indonesia and the Philippines exhibit relatively high in￿ ation
targets by international standards, implying that running a currency union
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be less of a crucial issue for monetary stabilisation if the union comprises the
entire EEA region, but it is a potentially important matter if one considers
ASEAN monetary integration.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for the study of cur-
rency unions of small open economies, with a focus on the conduct of mone-
tary policy in the presence of di⁄erent types of shocks. The model results are
then used to empirically assess the prospects for monetary integration between
emerging East Asian (EEA) economies. Our model extends the previous lit-
erature by allowing for a richer setup with a broad set of shocks, the role of
in￿ ation targets and the choice of interest rates as the instrument of union-
wide monetary policy. In doing so, it sheds light on an important, albeit no
so well understood, aspect of monetary integration, namely, that of monetary
policy stabilisation among small open economies forming a common currency
area. Further work on the theoretical front could extend the present framework
by introducing forward-looking behaviour beyond interest rate determination,
informational frictions and lag structures.
Our empirical investigation looks at a number of characteristics of EEA
countries that helps us gauge supply-side diversity, distinguishing between ag-
gregate and more speci￿cally tradable sector structural features. Moreover,
we discuss the evidence on the cross-country variation of disturbances hitting
the region, as well as recent data on in￿ ation targets. Overall, our analysis
shows that EEA economies display rather diverse supply characteristics, the
evidence that shocks are highly correlated across the region is not very com-
pelling and some countries declare relatively high desired levels of in￿ ation. In
the case of the latter aspect, our analysis suggests that desired in￿ ation rates
in the two ASEAN-5 in￿ ation targeters (Indonesia and the Philippines) would
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entire EEA region, but it is a potentially important matter if one considers
strict ASEAN monetary integration. A better factual understanding of wel-
fare implications of monetary integration in EEA would bene￿t from future
empirical work concerning estimation of structural parameters for the region￿ s
economies as well as further investigation of the cross-country properties of
disturbances. The present paper does not assess other important aspects that
have attracted interest in the literature on monetary integration in Asia, such
as the current state of institutional development concerning economic and
in particular ￿nancial regional integration, the ￿nancial market integration
between EEA countries (constrained by the presence of capital controls and
insulated banking sectors in some countries) and the lack of strong political
will to push the regional integration e⁄orts forward (see, e.g., Eichengreen and
Bayoumi, 1999, Kwack, 2005, Williamson, 2002, and Wyplosz, 2002).
The previous analysis may help explain why the major issue for monetary
integration in EEA at present is not a formation of a currency union, but rather
monetary coordination under a variety of forms. Having said this, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that integration via trade, ￿nancial and ￿nancial ￿ ows
go hand in hand with each other. For this reason, increasing trade, ￿nancial
and investment interdependence could reinforce each other over time, leading
to a di⁄erent conclusion regarding the degree of maturity of the conditions for
deeper economic integration and in particular a monetary union. Understand-
ing the implications of increasing spillovers would also necessitate the use of
approaches that deviate from our small open economy assumption, incorpo-
rating the ￿ avour of either two-country or core-periphery models, depending
on the speci￿c con￿guration taking place. In addition, further progress in real
and monetary integration may prove instrumental in shaping ongoing devel-
opments in the sphere of domestic policies (including monetary and exchange
rate policies) and regional ￿nancial cooperation e⁄orts.
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This Appendix derives aggregate supply schedule (1) from assumptions about
changes in the prices of domestic goods and imports. Deviations of non-
tradable in￿ ation, ￿N
i ; from its expected value are driven by above-potential





i + ￿iyi + "N
i (A.1)
Tradable in￿ ation, ￿T
i ; is the sum of two parts: i) expected plus unexpected
foreign in￿ ation, (￿￿e
i +"￿
i), and ii) expected plus unexpected nominal e⁄ective
exchange rate depreciation, (se





i +  i) (A.2)
All error terms in (A.1) and (A.2) are assumed to be white noise with
constant variance.
Using (A.1) and (A.2), aggregate supply schedule (1) can then be de-
rived, with country i￿ s overall actual and expected in￿ ation being de￿ned as
￿i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)￿N
i + ￿i￿T
i and ￿e
i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)￿Ne
i + ￿i (￿￿e
i + se
i); respectively.
Parameter ￿i re￿ ects the weight of non-tradables in the economy. In (1),
coe¢ cient ￿i equals 1=[(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i]; while aggregate supply shock "i can be






i +  i) (A.3)
The ￿rst term in (A.3) captures shocks arising from unexpected non-tradable
in￿ ation. The second term is a composite shock to tradable in￿ ation driven
by unexpected developments in either tradable prices in foreign currency or
nominal e⁄ective exchange rates. The latter two developments can in turn
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trade (abstracting from di⁄erent in￿ ation facing di⁄erent countries for the
same tradable goods) and idiosyncratic weights attached to di⁄erent trading
partners, respectively.
Note that we do not assume anything in particular about the covariation
of supply shock "i￿ s components. However, the latter might not be simply
uncorrelated among each other. For instance, shocks to foreign prices as cap-
tured by "￿
i could be correlated with shocks to e⁄ective exchange rate shocks
in  i. In this regard, for advanced economies, JimØnez-Rodr￿guez and SÆnchez
(2005) show empirically that oil shocks induce a real exchange rate appreci-
ation in some countries (such as the US and Germany) while inducing a real
exchange rate depreciation in others (such as other euro area countries and
Japan). Further work could help establish the exact statistical interaction
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Direction of Trade Statistics
 (unless otherwise stated)
.
1)
 Taiwan's data comes from its Ministry of Finance.
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Sources: World Bank's 
World Development Indicators





Unless otherwise indicated, per capita Gross National Income (GNI) estimated according to World
Bank Atlas method of converting data in national currency to current US dollars. The Atlas method
averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences 
in rates of inflation between the country and the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, th
e
United Kingdom, and the United States). The resulting total GNI estimate is then divided by th
e
mid-year population to obtain per capita GNI.
2)
Output data in USD is obtained by dividing current GNP in local currency by the corrresponding
bilateral exchange rate. Deflated by US GDP deflator, rebased to 1995 = 100 to obtain the constant
USD series.
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griculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry and fishing. Industry comprises value added in mining, manuf
acturing (also reported
as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas (ISIC divisions 10-45), Manufacturing refers to industries b
elonging to divisions 15-37, 
Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99. Unless otherwise indicated, GDP data are at current market prices.
2)
The latest observation refers to 2002.
4)
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Sources: World Economic Forum's (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Repor
t
, Institute for Management Developments' (IMD) 
World Competitiveness Yearboo
k
    and INSEAD/WEF's 





The number of total countries analysed by the surveys is 104 in the cases of WEF and INSEAD/WEF, and 60 for IMD.
2)
The overall index is not necessarily bounded by the values of the sub-components due to adjustments made by the source.
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Sources: National sources for trade statistics.
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Sources: National sources for trade statistics.
1)
 Data for the Phillipines is for 2003.
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Direction of Trade Statistics
.
1)
 No comparable data is available for Taiwan.
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 An increase (decrease) in the value of this variable implies a nominal exchange rate appreciation (depreciation).
2
)
 No data is available for Indonesia.
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Sources: BIS and IMF's 




 An increase (decrease) in the value of this variable implies a real exchange rate appreciation (depreciation).
2)
 Data for Indonesia comes from JP Morgan.
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Sources: Bank of Korea, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Thailand, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas websites.
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